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The effectiveness of New forfc's Toy/or Law, and of the Public
Emphyment Relations Board esfabiished under it, may be
measatt^d in a namber of ways. One is to see wftetfcer it does,
in fact, eiiminate striim of pubiie employs. Another is to
compare tlie results of mediation and fact-finding under the
Board's auspices with settlements arrived at without inter-
vention of PERB. The authors, who are engaged in a broad
study of the latter kind, present some of their findings as they
reiate to the public school system during 7969 and 7970.
THE OUTCOME OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN
NEW YORK SCHOOLS UNDER THE TAYLOR LAW
by John E. Drotning and
David B. Lipsky*
The search for effective strike substitutes in public employment
has led scholars to devote much attention to the study of mediation,
arbitration, and fact-finding in the public sector.^  In September 1967
New York public employees came under the coverage of the Taylor
Law, providing impasse procedures for collective negotiations in the
public sector. An examination of some aspects of the New York
experience may provide some insights about the use and effective-
• John E. Drotning is Visiting Professor of Industrial Relations at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. David B. Lipsky is Assistant Professor at the New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.
The authors express gratitude to Dr. Thomas E. Joyner, Director of
Research, and to Mr. Joseph B. Phillips, Assistant Director of Research,
New York State Public Employment Relations Board, for their cooperation
and suggestions. However, the authors retain full responsibility for the
analysis and conclusions in this article.
1. For example, see Richard Pegnetter, "Fact-Finding and Teacher Salary
Disputes: The 1969 Experience in New York State," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, vol. 24, no. 2, January 1971, pp. 226-242; Jean
T. McKelvey, "Fact-Finding in Public Employment Disputes: Promise
or Illusion," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 22, no. 4, July
1969, pp. 528-543; James L. Stem, "The Wisconsin Public Employee
Fact-Finding Procedure," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, voL 20,
no. 1, October 1966, pp. 3-29; David B. Ross, "The Arbitration of Public
Employee Wage Disputes," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol.
23, no. 1, October 1969, pp. 3-14; Robert J. Jossen, "Fact-Finding: Is
It Adjudication or Adjustment?" Arbitration Journal, vol. 24, no. 2,
1969. For an excellent bibliography of collective bargaining in the public
sector generally, see Michael H. Moskow, J. Joseph Loewenberg, and Ed-
ward C. Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment (New
York: Random House, 1970), pp. 307-325.
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ness of statutory impasse procedures in public employee disputes.
In tbe first section of this paper we discuss tbe general effective-
ness of public sector settlement procedures in terms of tbeir avowed
objectives. Reference is made to tbe use of impasse procedures under
New York's Taylor Law. In tbe second section of tbe paper tbe fac-
tors that are probably related to the incidence of fact-finding in
public teacher disputes are analyzed. No doubt tbe andysis in this
section can be extended to otber categories of public employees. In
addition, information is supplied on tbe composition and experience
of tbe panel of mediators and fact finders employed by New York's
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and also on tbe costs
of mediation and fact-finding in New York.
I, The Use of Impasse Procedures in Achieving the Law's Objectives
The effectiveness of any legislation can be evaluated only in
light of its professed purposes, which in tbe case of tbe Taylor Law
are two-fold: (1) "to promote harmonious and cooperative relation-
ships between government and its employees" and (2) "to protect
the public by assuring, at all times, tbe orderly and uninterrupted
operations and functions of government."* Stated somewbat differ-
ently, tben, the Act seeks to prevent strikes and to encourage tbe
resolution of contract disputes by the parties tbenMelves.
It is exceedingly difficult to judge the impasse procedures ac-
cording to the absence or presence of strikes. Stoppages in tbe public
service are illegal, and the Taylor Law imposes strict penalties on
violators of this proscription.' This does not mean, of course, tbat
the strike weajjon is never used by public employees. Nevertheless,
the possible penalties for striking are probably one factor explaining
tbe relative absence of strikes in New York State education, as well
as otber public sector jurisdictions.
2. Public Employees Fair Employment Law (New York State), Sec. 200.
3. Under the Taylor Law, a striking union may be subject to loss of check
off privileges and court imposed fines. An individual striker may (1)
lose two days' pay for each day he is out; (2) be placed on probation
for one year during which time he serves without tenure; and (3) suffer
other disciplinary action (fine and/or imprisonment) as provided by the
Civil Service Law. Many have argued that such penalties encourage em-
ployees to manifest their grievances in more subtle ways, which may
have equally or even more severe repercussions on the efficient opera-
tion of government than a strike itselif. The inability to resolve disputes
to the satisfaction, let alone delight, of the parties may result in ex-
cessive turnover, morale problems, slowdowns, or other minor acts of
sabotage (not necessarily in the violent sense) which inhibit progress
toward the central function of government, namely, the provision of
certain collective services.
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If the strike criterion is an inadequate measure of effectiveness,
another must be framed. One alternative is to ask whether or not
the impasse procedures increase the parties' reliance on outside in-
tervention. That is, does the law stimulate the resolution of conflict
without a third party? Or does the law induce undue reliance on
outside help?
Either alternative could be justified as an a priori hypothesis. For
example, one might expect, particularly in the case of teachers
unions and school boards with little negotiating experience, that out-
side experts called in a difficult situation would be able to provide
valuable lessons in the art of bargaining. The parties might learn
from a mediator how to avoid committing themselves publicly to
an untenable position, or from a fact finder how to formulate and
defend reasonable and realistic proposals and counter-proposals. In
short, knowledgeable third parties might serve as instructors to inex-
perienced participants on both sides.
On the other hand, there is some prior experience to indicate
that whenever free and unlimited outside intervention is available
to the parties, they tend to forgo bargaining in anticipation of the
third party's arrival and to condition their behavior on the expected
impact it will have on the outside J^ent. The classic example, of
course, is the railroad industry, where the parties' insistence on bar-
gaining nationally has, for all intents and purposes, precluded resort
to the strike weapon. The recent history of bargaining on the rail-
roads, if it can be called "bargaining" in the conventional sense at
all, hardly invites optimism for bargaining in the public service.*
Furthermore, returning to the point made earlier, few observers of
labor relations on the railroads would conclude from the absence
of strike activity that the Railway Labor Act is working well.
Therefore it seems that the most promising way to evaluate
mediation and fact-finding under the Taylor Law is to measure
the extent to which the parties are encouraged to reach their own
settlements or, conversely, are led to depend on outsiders to help
them. At this juncture, certain conceptual problems present them-
selves. First, how is a voluntary settlement defined? Clearly, a dicho-
tomous definition would be inappropriate, since there are obviously
gradations of third party intervention. It thus becomes necessary to
arrange bargaining outcomes on some scale which measures the ex-
tent to which the parties arrived at a settlement on their own. The
4. See Jacob J. Kaufman, "The Railroad Labor Dispute: A Marathon of
Maneuver and Improvisation," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
vol. 18, no. 2, January 1965, pp. 196-212.
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extremes of this spectrum are fairly clear—bilateral agreement with-
out an intervenor at one end, and perhaps unilateral imposition of
terms with complete utilization of the impasse procedures at the
other. However, the intermediate steps are somewhat fuzzier. Have
the procedures worked "better," for example, if a fact finder's report
is accepted without change than if the report merely furnishes the
basis for a subsequent settlement on somewhat different terms?
One obvious outcome of the fact-finding process is for both par-
ties to accept the report in its entirety. Another successful outcome
is for both sides jointly to modify the report to their mutual satis-
faction. On the other hand, both sides may strongly reject the re-
port. But it is outcomes in between which pose some difficulties,
that is, near settlements and no settlements. For example, one party
may accept while the other modifies in a fashion unacceptable to
the other or both parties may modify, each in a way that is in-
compatible with the other (near settlements). Another class of out-
comes involves combinations of rejection by one party with un-
modified or modified acceptances by the other (no settlement). The
difficulty then is to array these outcomes in a rank order which is
a valid measure of voluntarism.
The records of New York State's Public Employment Relations
Board permit some flesh to be added to the discussion. Table 1 shows
the experience under the Taylor Law for the calendar year 1969.
Table 2 gives the record for the first nine months of 1970.° First it
should be noted that the bulk of cases closed by PERB involved
public school disputes (453 out of 569, about 80 percent in 1969 and
373 out of 481 or 78 percent in 1970). Second, not all school dis-
tricts have used the procedures of the Taylor Act. There were about
751 school districts in the state in 1969. A large but unknown num-
ber had not yet been organized for collective bargaining; presumably
most of the unorganized districts were small and rural. The re-
mainder of the districts were organized but either settled without
any intervention whatsoever, or did not carry on authentic collec-
tive bargaining (in which case the school board continued to exer-
cise effective unilateral authority).
Of the cases coming to PERB, 45.3 percent in 1969 and 60.1
percent in 1970 were settled by mediation. In 1969, as Table 1 shows,
a higher percentage of non-school cases were settled by mediation
5. The record for the final three months of 1970 was not available at the
time of this writing. Almost all school cases are closed by the end of
September. On the other hand, many non-school cases arise between
October and December, the usual date of municipal contract expirations.
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than were school cases. But in 1970, the picture cbanges. About 63
percent of non-scbool cases were settled by mediation in 1970. Furtb-
er, altbough no hard statistics are available, tbe proportion of non-
scbool cases reaching impasse is believed to be significantly lower
than school cases. Note tbat a handful of cases coming to PERB
were settled without mediation. In these cases one or both of the
parties declared an impasse, but settlement was achieved before a
PERB appointed mediator entered actively into tbe negotiations.
TABLE I
The Use of Impasse Procedures Under the Taylor Law, 1969
Stage at which case closed Total Cases School Cases Non-school Cases
No. No. No.
Settled without
intervention 28
Settled by mediation 258
Settled by mediated
fact-finding
(no report) 53
Settled by fact-finding;
report accepted
without modification 93
Settled by fact-finding;
report niodified 135
Closed for otber
reasons 2
Super conciliations* (37
4.9
45.3
9.3
21
184
4.6
40.6
7
74
46 10.2
6.0
63.8
6.0
16.3
23.7
0.5
(6.5)
83
117
2
(33)
18.3
25.8
0.5
(7.3)
10
18
0
(4)
8.7
15.5
0.0
(3.4)
Total cases closed 569 100.0 453 100.0 116 100.0
* Non-additive
SOURCE: New York Public Employment Relations Board.
Exactly 200 fact-finding reports were written in scbool cases
in 1969 compared to 28 in non-school cases. In 1970, tbe number of
fact-finding reports in school cases dropped to 102, about balf of
tbe previous year's total. The total of non-school cases for 1970 will
obviously exceed that of 1969, since many non-school negotiations
begin in September. Tbe contract expiration date for many munic-
ipal employees is December 31st.
Wbat comparison of 1969 and 1970 may suggest is that reliance
on PERB by school districts and teachers is declining, wbile more
non-school negotiators are coming to PERB for assistance in nego-
tiations.
However, tbe evidence covers less than two years. In order to
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judge whether, abstracting from other influences, the impasse pro-
cedures available to the parties are being relied on to a greater or
lesser degree over time, one should follow negotiations over as many
years as possible. Certainly this shovild give some indication as to
whether or not the Act tends to "promote harmonious and coop-
erative relationships between government and its employees."
TABLE 2
The Use of Impasse Procedures Under the Taylor Law,
January to September 1970
Stage at which case closed Total Cases School Cases Non-school Cases
Settled without
intervention
Settled by mediation
Settled by mediated
fact-finding report
(no report)
Settled by fact-finding;
report accepted
without modification
Settled by fact-finding;
report modified
Closed for other
reasons
Super conciliation*
Total cases closed
• Non-additive
SOURCE: New York
No.
9
289
42
75
56
10
(20)
481
%
1.8
60.1
8.7
15.6
11.7
2.1
(4.2)
100.0
No.
9
221
36
60
42
5
(15)
373
%
2.4
59.2
9.7
16.1
11.3
1.3
(4.0)
100.0
No.
0
68
6
15
14
5
(5)
108
Public Employment Relations Board.
%
0.0
63.0
5.5
13.9
13.0
4.6
(4.6)
100.0
IL Factors Related to the Use of Fact-Finding in School Negotiations
What are the various factors which influence the method or
manner in which settlement is achieved in public sector disputes?
Why is it that some school districts are able to reach settlement by
themselves, while others require outside help? And why do some
districts require only the assistance of a mediator (essentially a be-
havioral intervenor) while others proceed to the fact-finding stage
(which is at least partly a juridical process—the third party pro-
poses the terms of settlement) ? What factors, if any, distinguish
bargaining relationships which rely to varying degrees on third par-
ties who perform the actual functions of bargaining, that is, who
formulate and propose specific resolutions of labor disputes?
The variables which influence the mode of settlement in a
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given set of circumstances may be conveniently grouped into three
categories. These can be designated economic, institutional, and pro-
cedural.* The discussion rests specifically on the incidence of fact-
finding in New York public teacher disputes.
A. Economic Variables
One factor which may be related to the difficulty or ease of
resolving teacher disputes without outside intervention is the dis-
trict's ability to pay. However, the best measure of ability to pay is
not entirely clear. Perhaps the most appropriate standard is that
suggested by David B. Ross: "In order to reflect a community's
ability to pay, the potential tax base must be considered in light of
the community's need for a particular service. Available tax resources
thus may be defined as the potential tax base per unit of need.'"^
Whatever the measure used, however, the relationship is uncertain.'
One might argue that a wealthy district can afford to be more
generous and satisfy its teachers' demands with little hailing. On
the other hand, unions facing wealthy districts are likely to escalate
their demands accordingly, and thus make voluntary settlements
more difficult. Moreover, in some districts, there may be discrepan-
cies between the political unit's assessed value and income. It must
be remembered that taxes are paid out of income, not assessed
valuation.
A sophisticated public negotiator might know that ability to
pay is a criterion likely to be used by a fact finder. Stem found
that it was the second most important criterion, falling right be-
hind wage comparisons as a standard applied in Wisconsin fact-find-
ing cases.® If the parties know the fact finder will invoke ability to
6. A fourth possible category can be labeled "behavioral." This category is ex-
cluded from discussion here, although the authors readily concede the
critical influence of behavioral factors (e.g., interpersonal relations and
attitudes) on the settlement process. The authors are principally con-
cerned, however, with factors which are more easily Observable, more
nearly objective and measurable, and, further, which may more readily
lend themselves to control by public policy.
7. ROB, op. cit., p. 8.
8. Ashenfelter and Johnson have fotmd that, in the private sector, profits
have a negligible effect on strike levels. One might regard profits as
analogous to ability to pay and strikes analogous to settlement procedures.
Orley Ashenfelter and George E. Johnson, "Bargaining Theory, Trade
Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American, Economic Review
vcJ. 59, no. 1, March 1969, p. 45.
9. Stem, op. cit., p. 15. According to Pegnetter, "Ability to pay was the
rationale most frequently relied on by school board negotiators." Pegnet-
ter, op. cit., p. 235. Fact finders cited the criterion in about one-quarter
of their reports. Ibid., p. 231.
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pay as a basis for his recommendations, school boards in wealthier
districts may wish to avoid fact-finding for this reason, while unions
in such districts may be encouraged to hold out for a fact finder.
But since in New York State either party can invoke the fact-finding
procedure, it is likely that in the aggregate a direct relation between
ability to pay and the incidence of fact-finding exists.
Another economic factor must be considered. Undoubtedly there
are patterns in the negotiation of teacher collective agreements, and
discovering the configuration of these patterns may help us to pre-
dict the probability of voluntary settlements. Those districts most
instrumental in setting the pattern—the "leaders"—^may undergo the
most difficult negotiations and therefore be more prone to go to fact-
finding. But "followers" may require little authentic bargaining, let
alone fact-finding, to arrive at a settlement. They merely imitate
the key settlement.
The time sequence of sets of negotiations may determine the
pattern: early negotiators set the pattern, later ones follow it. The
size, composition, and location of the district may also help deter-
mine the pattern. But scholars such as Reder and Eckstein and Wil-
son have demonstrated that, even though patterns may have certain
institutional parameters, they are fundamentally related to economic
factors.^ " One might then look at clusters of districts, geographically
proximate, with similar tax bases, school expenditures, and salary
structures, to see if fact-finding is more prevalent among certain
districts within a pattern, or alternatively whether leaders (provided
they can be identified) are more prone to fact-finding than followers.
It would seem reasonable to argue that once a pattern has been
firmly set for a given region, there should be little need for fact-
finding, unless one of the parties has a good reason for trying to
break the pattern, and hence becomes a "tough bargainer." Even
then, given the disposition of fact finders to use wage comparisons
as a principal basis for their recommendations, one must doubt the
usefulness of fact-finding to a "pattern-breaker." In fact, in such
situations, it may be that the party's latent reason for requesting
fact-finding is to get the intervenor's support for the existing pattern.
If a tightening market makes bargaining more difficult, one
would expect a greater tendency to rely upon fact-finding in the face
of upward shifts in the demand for teachers. This implies a rising
10. Melvin Reder, "The Theory of Union Wage Policy," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics^ vol. 34, no. 1, February 1952, pp. 34-45; O. Eck-
stein and T. A. Wilson, "The Determinants of Money Wage Changes in
American Industry." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 76, no. 3,
August 1962, pp. 379-414.
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starting salary: public employers may resist such market pressures,
thus forcing the employees to push to fact-finding. In these cases it
is extremely important that the negotiating parties consider relevant
measures of teacher demand: the rate of increase of new hires in a
district, the rate of increase of pupils in a district, or declines in the
teacher-pupil ratio. Moreover, increases in the supply of teachers,
a likely picture in the coming years, will exert downward pressure
on salaries, especially if demand rises less rapidly than supply. This,
compounded with the inflation of the past few years, can only ex-
acerbate problems for the negotiators. It might be safe to say that
rapid economic change is likely to increase the probability of fact-
finding.
B. Institutional Variables
The use of fact-finding in a school district must be related partly
to the political climate of that district. In judging the "political
climate" of a given school district, it is necessary to avoid simplis-
tic epithets like "liberal" and "conservative." It is plausible to hypo-
thesize, however, that districts in which there is political stability
would find it easier to reach voluntary settlement than those where
the situation is more volatile. The school board member who is
constantly peering over his shoulder at his constituency m^ht well
feel obliged to adopt a "tougher" bargaining stance than his morti
secure counterpart. And the more adamant bargainer, of course,
is in turn more likely to find himself in fact-finding. All this says
simply that political instability is the parallel of economic instability.
Both are likely to increase the incidence of third party intervention.
There are a number of possible approaches to measuring pol-
itical instability. One is to ascertain the tenure of school board
members or their relative turnover. Another might be to use the
results of recent votes on bond issues or budgets in the district or
neighboring districts. Presumably, board members in areas where
school expenditures have been the object of voter dismay will be
politically sensitive to the demands of teachers. Still another con-
sideration would be whether the school board is fiscally independent,
although it is not immediately clear whether independent boards
would be more or less likely to reach agreement without inter-
vention.^ ^
11. The independent board may be in a better position to agree to union
demands because of its control over the bucket, but at the same time
it would presumably be more vulnerable to political pressures and less
able to "pass the buck" to another pdslic authority.
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The political climate of a school district is related to the dis-
trict's willingness to pay. To some extent this factor is beclouded
by the same problems as ability to pay. A district which is more
willing to pay may want to settle quickly (and generously), but a
union may take advantage of the district's instincts and push them
to fact-finding. However—in contrast to ability to pay—a district
allready straining its resources to meet its educational needs may
receive a good deal of sympathy from a fact finder. This would
provide a union with a disincentive to call upon outsiders. There-
fore, one might expect to find a direct relationship between some
relevant measure of willingness to pay and the probability of volim-
tary settlement.
In this connection David B. Ross speaks of a community's "ef-
fort": "An idea of the effort a community has made to supply
public services comes from comparing its ability to pay, measured
by its taxable resources, and the amount of tax revenues which
actually have been collected and spent on services."" Thus one use-
ful measure of willingness to pay is the ratio of the wage and salary
component of school expenditures to assessed value of real property,
which Ross would call the "resource utilization ratio."^^
On the question of union strength, McKelvey seems to believe
that where "strong and militant labor organizations" exist, fact-
finding is likely to be less "effective."^* That is, it will be heavily
relied upon and further, the fact finders' reports will be rejected.
Stem adds, "In the future strong unions in the big cities may tend
to overuse the procedure and then tire of it .""
Independent and unaffiliated local bargaining agents are prob-
ably less militant than groups associated with either the National
Education Association or the American Federation of Teachers. AFT
locals are probably more militant than NEA affiliates. Other mea-
sures of union strength may be more useful. The ratio of union mem-
bership to the number of teachers in the district gives an indication
of union strength. The rate of growth of union membership would
be another indicator of union strength.
Further, McKelvey believes fact-finding is less effective, "where
both sides have had more experience in collective bargaining, have
more sophisticated practitioners, or have a longer history of joint
dealings."^* It should be noted again that McKelvey, in speaking of
12. Ross, op. cit., p. 6.
13. Ibid.,-p. 7.
14. McKelvey, op. cit., p. 539.
15. Stem, 0^. cit., p. 19.
16. McKelvey, op. cit., pp. 539-540.
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"effectiveness," is referring principally to tbe acceptance of tbe fact
finder's report, and not to the incidence of fact-finding itself.
In New York State, the parties bave the opportunity to enter
into voluntary written agreements providing for procedures to be
followed in the event of impasse, rather than relying upon tbe statu-
ctn7- pi-ocKubres;-'-' McKe^vey preaVcts, • t^Tontractuaf unpasse proce-
dures will become more prevalent and may well replace statutory
procedures."^* If tbis is so, a longer bargaining history may lead to
less reliance upon tbe statutory procedure of fact-finding. Tbere is
no obvious reason wby contract impasse procedures sbould be sub-
stantively different from tbe impasse procedures of tbe Taylor Law.
Furtber, Krinsky, in bis study of tbe Wisconsin procedure, dis-
covered tbat "initial use of fact-finding has improved tbe bargain-
ing relationsbips botb in terms of educating tbe parties tbrougb tbe
recommendations and making tbem realize tbat tbey should be able
to bargain themselves and reacb the same point tbat a fact finder
would recommend witbout going tbrougb tbe cost and delays of tbe
process."" This may not be true in New York State wbere tbere is
no direct cost to the parties of fact-finding. (Nevertheless, there are
delays, wbich bave a cost equivalent, and can serve tbe function of
promoting voluntary settlements.)
At this point it is interesting to look at tbe cost of tbe proce-
dures to tbe State of New York. Table 3 shows a breakdown of
mediation and fact-finding costs for 1969 and 1970. Tbe median
cost of mediation was about $350 a case botb years. Tbe median
cost of fact-finding was about $450 a case in 1969 and about $500
a case in 1970. Whether these costs are excessive or not is a function
of the benefits flowing from tbe settlements or conversely tbe costs
avoided as a consequence of few work stoppages in public employ-
ment in New York State since tbe advent of tbe Taylor Law. In
any event there is no evidence to indicate tbat tbe costs of tbe im-
passe procedures to the taxpayers of New York bave been increas-
ing substantially.
In addition to tbe opinions of McKelvey and Krinsky, Belasco
and Alutto found that as a consequence of the high tvunover and
inexperience of teacher negotiators, "tbe negotiation process itself
was laborious and agreement difficult to reacb. In particular, tbere
17. Public Employees Fair Employment Law (New York State [the Taylor
Law]), section 209.
18. McKelvey, op. cit.^ p. 543.
19. Edward B. Krinsky, "An Analysis of Fact-Finding as a Procedure for
the Settlement of Labor Disputes Involving Public Employees," Ph.D.
dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1969.
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were innumerable instances in which negotiators for both sides missed
crucial 'signals' because they were insensitive to such cues."^° Hence,
one might hypothesize that experienced or professional negotiators
would lead to less reliance on fact-finding.
TABLE 3
TKe Cost of Impasse Procedures in New York St«te,
1969 and 1970*
Cost per
Case
$ 50-349
350-499
500-649
650-949
950-1099
$1,100 and up
Total
1969
Mediation
No. of Cases %
161
78
38
27
10
7
321
50.1
24.3
11.8
8.4
3.2
2.2
100.0
Fact-Finding
No. of Cases %
105
51
47
45
11
31
290
36.2
17.6
16.2
15.5
3.8
10.7
100.0
1970
Mediation
No. of Cases %
177
55
48
22
11
13
326
54.3
16.9
14.7
6.7
3.4
4.0
100.0
Fact-Finding
No. of Cases %
84
38
44
37
15
27
245
34.3
15.5
18.0
15.1
6.1
11.0
100.0
• Only bills submitted between the months of January and September of each
year are shown, permitting direct comparisons between the two years.
It might be posited, on the other hand, that if fact-finding has
an educational function, it is to teach the parties the advantages
of its use. The age, or "vintage," of a bargaining relationship can
be measured in at least two ways: the number of years the district's
teachers have been organized, and the number of contracts negotiat-
ed in the district. The "maturity" of the relationship can also be
represented in one of several ways, e.g., whether the contract con-
tains a grievance procedure and arbitration provision or whether
professional negotiators are employed. Thus, mature relationships
may be characterized by a high incidence of fact-finding.
Belasco and Alutto also found that "those teachers most favor-
ably disposed toward both collective bargaining and strikes were
either married males, teaching in the secondary schools, and/or be-
tween the ages of 31 and 45. These results . . . indicate that while
the bulk of teachers are favorably disposed towards collective action,
some groups of teachers may be more willing than others to actually
engage in collective activities."^^ This finding leads to the hypothesis
that there may be a relationship between the composition of the
teacher work force and the proclivity to use fact-finding. Districts
20. James A. Belasco and Joseph A. Alutto, "Organizational Impacts of Teach-
er Negotiations," Industrial Relations, vol. 9, no. 1, October 1969, p. 70.
21. Ihid., p. 70.
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characterized by a work force predominantly consisting of prime-
age, married males may show a higher incidence of fact-finding.
Put in other terms, the higher the degree of commitment to bar-
gaining, the likelier the use of all dispute settlement procedures
available to the parties.*^
It can also be postulated that the extent of participation is
related to fact-finding. Where many persons—and interests—are a
party to bargaining, settlements become more difficult to achieve.
The presence of diverse interests may be reflected by the size and
nature of the district—^voluntary settlements are likelier in small,
homogeneous districts.
There seems to be a difference of opinion on the relation be-
tween location and fact-finding. McKelvey says, "Fact-finding seems
to be more effective in smaller communities and rural areas than
in large urban centers . . ."^ ^ Stem reaches the opposite conclusion:
in all cases where fact-finding failed, "the municipal employer was
a county or small city in a rural or suburban section of Wisconsin."'*
Once again, however, the measure of effectiveness is whether the
report was accepted, not whether the procedure was used. Whether,
all other things being equal, fact-finding is more frequently used in
rural, suburban, or urban areas is a question which needs to be
explored. To the extent that urban areas are characterized by mili-
tant unions (as McKelvey believes), then fact-finding is likely to
have a higher incidence in such areas. The real question is what
location by itself represents, when it is not serving as a surrogate
for something else, e.g., militancy or inexperience.
C. Procedural Variables
One can put forth the proposition that effective mediation of
a dispute will forestall the need for fact-finding, but how is one to
measure effective mediation? Obviously mediation is effective if it
achieves a settlement, but this tells us little about the characteristics
of the process which lead to settlements. Is effective mediation de-
pendent upon the timing of intervention? Some observers recom-
mend early intervention, and it may be that early entrance by a
mediator lessens the necessity of fact-finding. However, as Stevens
22. Stem found that "successful fact-flnding," that is, acceptance of the fact
finder's report, was likelier in cases where the parties were committed
to bargaining. In "unsuccessful" cases, on the other hand, "manage-
ments did not look with favor upon any part of the process of collective
bargaining." Op. cit., p. 12.
23. McKelvey, op. cit., p. 539.
24. Stem, op. cit., p. 12.
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points out, attention must be paid to tbe "negotiation cycle," i.e.,
the progression of events or succession of stages common to many
collective negotiations.*" Tbe function of the mediator will vary ac-
cording to the stage of the cycle at wbich be enters. Early entrance
may result fn grandstanding and lessen the chance for settlement.
Another aspect of tbe timing question is tbe rapidity of response
of PERB and the appointed mediator to tbe request of the parties.
If, for some reason, there should be delays between tbe parties' call
for a mediator and his actual appearance at negotiations, tbe chances
of bis playing an effective role would seem to be diminisbed and
the likelihood of fact-finding increased.
The mediation process is one of the most intensely personal
facets of labor relations. The effectiveness of mediation depends
largely on the skills, experience, and personality of tbe mediator. A
thorough exploration is needed of the extent to which the charac-
teristics of the mediator help lead to settlement ratber tban fact-
finding.
A number of considerations are relevant here—tbe mediator's
primary occupation, his age, the number of PERB cases be has han-
dled, his record of success in the past, and so forth. One would
think that younger, inexperienced mediators, with little experience
in labor relations, would bave less cbance of success. However, older,
well-known mediators may bave developed biases and rigidities which
make tbem less effective. But there is some evidence to suggest tbat
experienced people are partly responsible for PERB's record since
1967. Table 4 shows that 45 percent of the PERB's three hundred
and nine (309) panel members are lawyers and 18 percent have
doctorates. Moreover, another nine percent bave a Master's degree.
In addition, when tabulated by primary occupation, nearly 74 per-
cent of the panel are attorneys, educators or professional arbitra-
tors. Attorneys and educators serving on the PERB panel are likely
to bave prior experience in collective bargaining.
Tbere are other aspects of mediation which may have an inti-
pact on the possibility of settlement. For example, are panels (mul-
tiple neutrals) more effective tban single intervenors? Small group
psycholt^y suggests tbat two or three men in groups of 10-12 can
have a significant impact on the direction of the group. Put simply
a panel may be able to generate much more pressure for settle-
ment than a single person. Moreover, bow does time affect the
25. Carl Stevens, "Mediation and the Role of the Neutral," in John T. Dun-
lop and Neil W. Chamberlain, eds.. Frontiers of Collective Bargaining
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 275.
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process? One might expect that successful negotiations are affected
by the amount of time (other things equal) that the mediator spends
with negotiating parties. In addition, his own drive to settle the
dispute must play a very important role in his efforts. Clearly, there
are times when holding on to a case too long hurts rather than
helps, but this is not likely to be a frequent problem. Another aspect
of time is the relationship of the meeting to the budget deadline.
It seems reasonable to think that successful mediation efforts occur
in time reasonably close to the budget or contract deadline, simply
because of the mounting pressures for settlement felt by both parties.
TABL£ 4
Education and Occupation of PERB Fact Finders and Mediators
(N = 309)
Education
High School Only
Some College
B.S. or B.A.
Some Graduate Work
Master's
Law
Doctorate
Combination Law &
Adv. Degree
Others or Unknown
%
1.9
3.6
5.8
4.2
9.1
45.3
17.8
11.0
1.3
Primary Occupation
Consultant
Mediator-Arbitrator
Clergy
Attorney
Educator
Management (Personnel)
Labor Official
Student
Other
%
3.2
9.1
0.7
41.4
24.6
8.4
1.9
LO
9.7
innn
100.0
III. Concluding Observations
In the discussion above the factors which cause variation in the
use of the impasse procedures were discussed; the question of the
effect of those variations on the terms of settlement was not taken
up. Does the use in varying degree of third parties differentiate the
quality of the final settlement? For example, are mediated settle-
ments significantly different from fact-finding settlements? Do unions
which rely on third parties do better than those which reach settle-
ment on their own?
At first glance, the answer may appear self-evident. Since it is
exceedingly unlikely that a fact finder would recommend settle-
ment terms inferior to those last proposed by the school board, one
might be tempted to conclude that a union will always do at least
as well, and sometimes better, than if it eschewed third party in-
tervention. This assertion is simplistic, for it ignores the bargaining
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Strategy of the school board. If the school were convinced that third
party intervention was inevitable, might it not deliberately refrain
from putting its best offer on the table ? It then becomes conceivable
that a fact-finder might recommend terms which are less valuable
to the union than those it should have obtained without fact-finding.
In this respect, moreover, the maturity of the bargaining relation-
ship becomes crucial, for one might well expect school boards which
are relatively inexperienced in bargaining matters to be less likely
to adopt this strategy.
Since the terms of settlement will depend on many factors other
than the settlement process, it would be necessary somehow to ad-
just for these other factors. Economic variables, in particular, seem
especially important. One possible approach would be to group school
districts in terms of some measure of ability to pay and to examine
each group separately. Other variables, such as "orbits of coercive
comparison," would also require standardization. In this case, school
districts might be grouped into a number of geographical units, with
each unit analyzed separately.
In conclusion, it is obvious from the analysis in this paper that
there are numerous questions in the area of the resolution of teacher
bai^aining disputes that need to be answered. The authors are now
undertaking a systematic examination of the empirical evidence
available in New York State, using the framework and hypotheses
shaped in this article, in the hope that some of the answers can
be provided.**
Any thorough, empirical investigation of the hypotheses and
questions raised in earlier pages doubtless would involve difficult
conceptual and methodological problems. Nevertheless, the authors
are convinced that such problems would not be insurmountable.
Further, there is little doubt that an administrative agency such as
New York State's Public Employment Relations Board ought to use
all the relevant information it can get in order to improve its ability
to implement the law. Certainly, organized research can be one
significant input for the makers of public policy.^'' New information
is one necessary ingredient of successful policy formulation and this
research is contemplated in that light.
26. The study is being sponsored by PERB under authority of the Taylor Law.
27. See for example, James A. Gross, "Economics, Politics and the Law: The
NLRB's Division of Economic Research, 1935-40," Cornell Law Review,
February 1970, p. 344.

